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1 Introduction
In this study, we explore the effects of subsidization on economic growth and social welfare
in a Schumpeterian economy with elastic labor supply and distortionary taxes. In many indus-
trialized economies where research activities for innovations are the major engine of growth, it is
observed that research and development (R&D) activities are highly intervened by government
policies. The necessity of government intervention on R&D activities has been justified by a spate
of endogenous growth theory literature that highlight the presence of a positive R&D externality,
since inventors of new products face knowledge spillovers and it is difficult for them to fully ap-
propriate the benefits of innovations (e.g., Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion
and Howitt (1992), and Jones and Williams (2000)).1 In subsequent R&D-based growth models,
the granting of monopoly rights to innovators and subsidies to R&D are the two major forms
of government policy instruments exploited to deal with such an R&D externality.2 On the one
hand, granting monopoly power to successful innovators in the form of patent protection allows
for pricing their goods above marginal costs, resulting in monopolistic profits that would create
sufficient incentives for entrepreneurs to perform R&D activities.3 Such a monopoly right, how-
ever, reduces the demand for production inputs to the level below the first-best allocation, and
hence, unavoidably leads to a distortion. On the other hand, given that innovations are usually
costly, subsidizing R&D investment seems able to effectively promote research activities to stim-
ulate growth,4 thereby generating sizable effects on welfare. Nevertheless, implementing such an
R&D policy still cannot remove the distortion of monopoly pricing, since this policy instrument
mainly affects the competitive R&D sector instead of the monopolistic production sector.
To internalize R&D externalities and remove the monopoly-pricing distortion, the existing
studies exploiting the R&D-based growth framework have used a subsidization-policy regime,
which includes subsidies to manufacturing and subsidies to R&D, in the framework of R&D-
based growth. In the presence of inelastic labor supply and lump-sum taxes through which
subsidies are financed, the model of Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2003) with expanding varieties of
new products shows that subsidies to manufacturing (through either final goods produced by
competitive firms or the purchase of intermediate goods produced by monopolistic firms) are
able to effectively restore the social optimum, which, however, cannot be achieved by subsidizing
R&D activities. In contrast, the model of Acemoglu (2009) with improving quality of existing
products implies that subsidizing both manufacturing and R&D is able to remove the distortions
1In addition to this positive R&D externality, there can also be negative R&D externalities due to duplicative R&D
(i.e., congestion externalities in Jones and Williams (1998, 2000)) and business stealing (Bloom et al. (2013)). However,
the positive R&D externality tends to substantially outweigh the negative externalities (Grossmann et al. (2013)), and
this is consistent with the existing empirical evidence suggesting that the social return to R&D exceeds the private
return by a wide margin. See Hall et al. (2010) for a complete review of the econometric literature on measuring the
private and social returns to R&D.
2See Park (2008) for a strengthening of patent protection across countries since the signing of the agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994. In addition, see Impullitti (2010) for evidence
on the widespread use of R&D subsidization in OECD countries since 1980s.
3The recent empirical evidence in Brown et al. (2017) finds that protection for intellectual property has positive
effects on R&D in OECD economies.
4See, for example, Minniti and Venturini (2017) who find that R&D tax credits have positive effects on productivity
growth of the US economy.
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and replicate the socially optimal allocation.5 Moreover, considering elastic labor supply with
the financing option altered to distortionary taxes, the analysis of Zeng and Zhang (2007) reveals
that in a variety-expansion model, using a single subsidy alone or even their combination cannot
reach the social optimum. Nevertheless, these related studies have not examined the growth and
welfare effects of the subsidization regime in a quality-ladder model with elastic labor supply
and distortionary taxes.6 Therefore, the novel contribution of our study is to fill this gap.
To meet the above objective, in this paper, we examine the growth and welfare effects of
three types of subsidy instruments: subsidies to the production of final goods, subsidies to
the purchase of intermediate goods, and subsidies to R&D.7 Specifically, this study revisits the
implications of these subsidies and their combinations by means of growth maximization and
welfare maximization. In addition, as for the model setting, we extend the R&D-based growth
framework of Acemoglu (2009) with quality improvement by incorporating elastic labor supply
and introducing distortionary taxes to finance subsidies. Additionally, this model is calibrated to
the US data to conduct a quantitative exercise for the above analysis.
The findings of this study are summarized as follows. First, the inefficiencies present in this
model originate from the static distortions in monopoly pricing and labor supply, along with
the dynamic distortion in R&D externalities. It is found that subsidies to manufacturing are more
effective in eliminating the former distortions, whereas subsidies to research (in fact, it is an R&D
tax in the first-best outcome) are more effective in eliminating the latter one. Thus, an optimal
mix of all policy instruments restores the social optimum. Second, in the calibrated economy,
when only a single subsidy tool is used, subsidizing R&D investment is less effective than sub-
sidizing manufacturing in terms of promoting growth and raising welfare. This is because the
benefits of innovations and the removal of inefficiencies are both less sensitive to the decrease in
research expenditures resulting from subsidies to R&D than to the increase in production vol-
ume induced by subsidies to manufacturing. Third, as for the use of a combination of any two
instruments, subsidizing the production of final goods and the purchase of intermediate goods is
most effective in promoting growth but least effective in raising welfare. The reason is that using
the two forms of subsidies to manufacturing together expands the dimension that enlarges the
production size and hence is most growth-stimulating. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, these
two subsidy instruments remove the same type of distortions, so their combination generates less
welfare as compared to the combinations of policy instruments involving R&D subsidies, which
remove different types of distortions. These results highlight the importance of the coordinated
use of subsidies to R&D and subsidies to manufacturing in raising social welfare.
This study relates to the vast literature that explore the effects of R&D subsidies in the R&D-
based growth models; see for example, Segerstrom (1998), Lin (2002), Dinopoulos and Syropoulos
(2007), S¸ener (2008), Impullitti (2010), Chu and Cozzi (2018), and Yang (2018), in which either
variety expansion or quality improvement is considered as the process of innovation, in addition
5Yang (2018) shows that mixing the subsidies to manufacturing and R&D will also achieve the social optimum
even if labor supply is elastic.
6The advantage of considering a Schumpeterian-type quality-ladder model is that both positive and negative R&D
externalities are present, so the problem of underinvestment or overinvestment in R&D could occur, depending on
the relative strength of the different types of R&D externalities.
7Throughout this study, subsidies to the production of final goods and those to the purchase of intermediate goods
are collectively called subsides to manufacturing.
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to Peretto (1998), Segerstrom (2000), Chu et al. (2016), and Chu and Wang (2019), in which the
two dimensions of innovation are combined. While inspiring, the aforementioned studies mainly
focus on financing subsidy costs with non-distortionary taxes, ruling out the distortionary effects
of taxes on aggregate equilibrium allocations. Our study differs from theirs by considering the
impacts of R&D subsidies when subsidization is financed by distortionary labor income taxes
that distort the consumption-labor decision.
This study also relates to the literature on R&D-based growth models that consider the mixed
use of subsidies to research and intermediate goods. Grossmann et al. (2013) show that in a semi-
endogenous growth model put forward by Jones (1995), a combination of a time-varying subsidy
to R&D and a constant subsidy to intermediate-goods production can achieve the socially opti-
mal growth path. Furthermore, Li and Zhang (2014) show that in the Matsuyama (1999) model
of growth through cycles, using subsides to R&D and the purchase of intermediate goods, either
individually or jointly, yields significant welfare gains. However, the analysis of these interesting
studies focuses on dynamic general equilibrium frameworks with inelastic labor supply.8 There-
fore, the present paper complements their studies by investigating the welfare implications when
labor is supplied elastically. It turns out that elastic labor supply plays a crucial role in our model
in attaining the social optimum.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup. Section
3 characterizes the decentralized equilibrium and explores the growth effect of subsidies. Sec-
tion 4 derives the first-best optimal outcome and analyzes the subsidy policy that restores the
social optimum. Section 5 performs a numerical analysis in a calibrated economy to evaluate
the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing subsidy instrument(s). Section 6 concludes the
study.
2 The model
In this study, we extend the version of the quality-ladder growth model in Acemoglu (2009)
(Chapter 14), which originates from Grossman and Helpman (1991), by incorporating (a) subsi-
dies to the production of final goods, the purchase of intermediate goods, and the expenditures
on R&D, and (b) elastic labor supply. Moreover, this model introduces distortionary labor in-
come taxes to finance the subsidies. This study analyzes the growth and welfare implications of
subsidization by controlling one or a mix of these policy instruments.
2.1 Households
Suppose that the economy admits a unit continuum of identical households, and the lifetime
utility function of each household is given by
U =
∫
∞
0
e−ρt[lnCt + θ ln(1− Lt)]dt, (1)
8One exception is Nuño (2011), who finds that the optimal mix of subsidies to research and intermediate-goods
production can replicate the first-best allocations in a Schumpeterian growth model with business cycles. Nevertheless,
the financing of subsidies in his analysis relies on a lump-sum tax on households.
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where ρ is the discount rate, Ct is the household’s consumption of final goods, and Lt is the
labor supplied by a household. The parameter θ > 0 indicates the intensity of leisure preference
relative to consumption.
There is no population growth in this economy.9 Each household chooses consumption Ct and
labor supply Lt to maximize its lifetime utility (1) subject to the instantaneous budget constraint
such that
A˙t = rtAt +Wt(1− τt)Lt − Ct, (2)
where At is the real value of financial assets owned by each household,Wt is the real wage rate, rt
is the real interest rate, and τt is the tax rate on labor wage. The standard dynamic optimization
implies the consumption-labor decision given by
(1− τt)Wt(1− Lt) = θCt, (3)
and the usual Euler equation given by
C˙t
Ct
= rt − ρ. (4)
Moreover, the households own a balanced portfolio of all firms in the economy. Finally, the
transversality condition is given by limt→∞ e
−ρtµtAt = 0, where µt is the Lagrange multiplier as-
sociated with the constraint (2) in the current-value Hamiltonian of the household. This condition
implies that neither asset or debt will remain at the end of the planning horizon.
2.2 Final goods
Final goods Yt are produced competitively by using labor and a continuum of intermediate
goods according to the following production function:
Yt =
L
1−β
t
β
∫ 1
0
qt(ν)Xt(ν)
βdν, β ∈ (0, 1) (5)
where Lt is the level of labor, Xt(ν) is the quantity of intermediate good in line ν ∈ [0, 1] whose
quality is qt(ν), and β measures the importance of intermediate good ν relative to labor in final
goods production. In addition, the quality qt(ν) evolves as follows:
qt(ν) = λ
nt(ν)q0(ν), (6)
where λ > 1 represents the step size of each quality improvement, nt(ν) is the number of inno-
vations in line ν that have occurred between time 0 and time t. Then, the profit function of the
9Our model results are robust to the consideration of population growth in that the counterfactual scale effect is
sterilized in a fully-endogenous approach. See the detailed discussions in Cozzi (2017a).
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competitive final-goods producers is given by
pˆit = (1+ sy,t)
L
1−β
t
β
∫ 1
0
qt(ν)Xt(ν)
βdν−WtLt − (1− sx,t)
∫ 1
0
Pt(ν)Xt(ν)dν, (7)
where sy,t ∈ (0, 1) (sy,t ∈ (−1, 0)) is the subsidy rate (tax rate) to the production of final goods
and sx,t ∈ (0, 1) (sx,t ∈ (−1, 0)) is the subsidy rate (tax rate) to the purchase of intermediate
goods.
With free entry and profit maximization, (5) yields the conditional demand functions for the
inputs, namely, the demand of labor:
Lt = (1+ sy,t)(1− β)
Yt
Wt
, (8)
and the demand for the intermediate good ν:
Xt(ν) =
(
1+ sy,t
1− sx,t
) 1
1−β
(
qt(ν)
Pt(ν)
) 1
1−β
Lt, (9)
where Pt(ν) is the price of the ν-th intermediate good relative to the final goods.
2.3 Intermediate goods
In each industry line ν ∈ [0, 1], intermediate goods are produced by a monopolistic leader
who holds a patent on the latest innovation and replaced by the products of an entrant who has
a new innovation due to the Arrow replacement effect. The marginal cost of producing a unit of
intermediate good is ψqt(ν) units of final goods, where ψ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the ν-th intermediate
goods producer maximizes her profits pit(ν) = [Pt(ν)− ψq(ν)]xt(ν) subject to the intermediate
goods demand in (9), which yields the profit-maximizing price such that
Pt(ν) = qt(ν), (10)
where, without loss of generality, we have normalized ψ = β. Substituting (10) into (9) generates
the quantity of intermediate good ν:
Xt(ν) =
(
1+ sy,t
1− sx,t
) 1
1−β
Lt. (11)
Additionally, according to (11), the profit function of the monopolistic firm is given by
pit(ν) = (1− β)
(
1+ sy,t
1− sx,t
) 1
1−β
qt(ν)Lt, (12)
which shows that the monopolistic profit is increasing in the quality of the products.
Technological progress in this model stems from the realizations of quality improvements in
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qt(ν) across all industry lines. Define the aggregate quality index Qt by a combination of the
total quality of intermediate goods:
Qt =
∫ 1
0
qt(ν)dν. (13)
Substituting (11) and (13) into the final goods production function in (5) yields the total output
in the final goods sector such that
Yt =
1
β
(
1+ sy,t
1− sx,t
) β
1−β
QtLt, (14)
which shows that the aggregate output is linearly increasing the aggregate quality of intermediate
goods. Next, using (11), the aggregate spending on intermediate goods is obtained by
Xt ≡
∫ 1
0
Pt(ν)Xt(ν)dν = β
(
1+ sy,t
1− sx,t
) 1
1−β
QtLt. (15)
Accordingly, the labor wage rate is given by
Wt = (1+ sy,t)
(
1− β
β
)(
1+ sy,t
1− sx,t
) β
1−β
Qt. (16)
Finally, using (12) and (13) yields the aggregate profit of the intermediate-goods sector, which is
given by
Πt ≡
∫ 1
0
pit(ν)dν = (1− β)
(
1+ sy,t
1− sx,t
) 1
1−β
QtLt. (17)
Observing (17) reveals that the total monopolistic profits Πt created by all inventions is increas-
ing in the policy instrument sy,t to the production of final goods and sx,t to the purchase of
intermediate goods, respectively.
2.4 Innovations and R&D
Denote the real value of a firm who holds the most recent innovation in line ν by Vt(ν).
Accordingly, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for Vt(ν) is given by
rtVt(ν) = pit(ν) + V˙t(ν)− pt(ν)Vt(ν), (18)
which is the no-arbitrage condition for the value of the asset (in the form of a patented inno-
vation). Equation (18) implies that the return on this asset rtVt(ν) equals the sum of the profit
flow pit(ν), the capital gain V˙t(ν), and the potential losses pt(ν)Vt(ν) that occur due to creative
destruction, where pt(ν) denotes the Poisson arrival rate of the next successful innovation in each
instant of time. Specifically, following the lab-equipment assumption, the formulation of pt(ν) is
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given by
pt(ν) =
ζzt(ν)
Ltqt(ν)
, (19)
where ζ > 0 is R&D productivity and zt(ν) are the units of final goods spent in R&D. Equation
(19) means that the probability of the next successful innovation is increasing in R&D expendi-
tures zt(ν) whereas decreasing in quality qt(ν); research on more advanced products becomes
more difficult, so one unit of R&D spending is proportionately less effective when applied to
a more sophisticated product. Moreover, to eliminate the scale effect in this model, we use the
fully endogenous solution by assuming that the arrival rate of innovations depends on the R&D
expenditures per unit of labor.10
New innovations in each line are invented by R&D firms, who have free entry into the re-
search market and incur positive expenditures on R&D subject to policy interventions in the form
of subsidization (taxation) at the rate of sr,t ∈ (0, 1) (sr,t ∈ (−1, 0)). Hence, the expected profit of
an R&D firm who spends zt(ν) in R&D in line ν that has quality q at time t must be zero such
that pt(ν)Vt(ν)− (1− sr,t)zt(ν) = 0, and it, together with (19), implies the zero-expected-profit
condition as follows:
Vt(ν) =
(1− sr,t)qt(ν)Lt
ζλ
. (20)
Since At is the market aggregate value of firms in the intermediate-goods sector, using (13)
yields
At =
∫ 1
0
Vt(ν)dν =
(1− sr,t)QtLt
ζλ
, (21)
implying that At is increasing in the aggregate quality of goods.
2.5 Government budget
Suppose that the policymaker can intervene the production of final goods, the purchase of
intermediate goods, and the expenditures on R&D by choosing the policy tools sy,t, sx,t, and sr,t,
respectively. These government interventions are financed by the distortionary tax levied on the
household’s labor income, such that
τtWtLt = sy,tYt + sx,tXt + sr,tZt, (22)
where Zt ≡
∫ 1
0 zt(ν)dν is the total spending on R&D. In (22), the left-hand side is the tax rev-
enues collected from the household and the right-hand side is the expenditures for subsidization.
Hence, in this model, the government can implement the subsidy (or tax) instruments to affect
the input allocations and steer the market economy.
10In the current literature, the fully endogenous solution proposed by Peretto (1998), Young (1998), and Howitt
(1999) and the semi-endogenous solution proposed by Jones (1995), Kortum (1997), and Segerstrom (1998) are the two
main approaches to remove the scale effect. See Cozzi (2017a,b) for detailed discussions.
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3 Decentralized equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of a sequence of allocations [Ct,Yt, Lt,Xt(ν), zt(ν)]∞t=0,ν∈[0,1] and a
sequence of prices [rt,Wt, Pt(ν), qt(ν),Vt(ν)]∞t=0,ν∈[0,1]. In each instant of time,
• households choose [Ct, Lt] to maximize their utility taking [rt,Wt] as given;
• competitive final-goods firms produce [Yt] and choose [Wt,Xt(ν)] to maximize profits taking
[Pt(ν), qt(ν)] as given;
•monopolistic leaders for intermediate goods produce [Xt(ν)] and choose [Pt(ν)] to maximize
profits;
• R&D firms choose [zt(ν)] to maximize profits taking [qt(ν),Vt(ν)] as given;
• the goods market clears such that Yt = Ct + Xt + Zt;
• the financial market clears such that At =
∫ 1
0 Vt(ν)dν.
3.1 Balanced growth path
In this subsection, we define the decentralized equilibrium and prove that the economy jumps
to a unique and stable balanced growth path (BGP). Hence, for an arbitrary path of subsidy rates
[sy,t, sx,t, sr,t]∞t=0, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. Holding constant sy, sx, and sr, the economy jumps to a unique and stable balanced
growth path along which {Wt,Qt,Xt,Zt,Yt,Ct} grow at the same and constant rate (i.e., g), and Lt = L
is stationary.
Proof. See Appendix A.
From Proposition 1, given a stationary time path of the policy levers, we can derive the
steady-state levels of some variables along the BGP as follows. First, for a given level of quality
q(ν) (which is constant over time until there is a new innovation in this line), the value of a firm
in line ν (i.e., V(ν)) does not change between time t and time t+ ∆t (where ∆t is an interval of
time), namely V˙t(ν) = 0. Thus, using (18) implies that V(ν) will be constant such that
V(ν) =
pi(ν)
r+ p(ν)
, (23)
where pi(ν), r, and p(ν) are the steady-state levels of monopolistic profits, the interest rate, and
the arrival rate of successful innovations in line ν, respectively. Then, combining (12), (20), and
(23) yields
r+ p(ν) = ζλ(1− β)
(
1+ sy
1− sx
) 1
β
(
1
1− sr
)
, (24)
which implies that along the BGP, the arrival rate of next successful innovations is independent of
the line index ν, denoted by p. In addition, the aggregate expenditures on R&D can be expressed
by
Zt =
∫ 1
0
z(ν)dν =
p
ζ
QtL. (25)
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By Proposition 1, substituting (24) into (4) yields
g = r− ρ =
[
ζλ(1− β)
(
1+ sy
1− sx
) 1
1−β
(
1
1− sr
)
− p
]
− ρ. (26)
Then, to pin down the growth rate of the aggregate quality index Qt, we know that in an in-
terval of time ∆t, there are pt∆t sectors that experience one innovation, and this increases their
productivity by λ. Hence, we have the dynamics of Qt given by
Qt+∆t = pt∆t
∫ 1
0
λqt(ν)dν + (1− pt∆t)
∫ 1
0
qt(ν)dν = Qt[1+ pt∆t(λ− 1)] (27)
Now subtracting Qt from both sides in (27), dividing it by ∆t, and taking the limit as ∆t → 0
yields
g =
Q˙t
Qt
= p(λ− 1), (28)
where Q˙t = lim∆t→0(Qt+∆t − Qt)/∆t. Then, combining (26) and (28) yields the steady-state
arrival rate of innovations such that
p = ζ(1− β)
(
1+ sy
1− sx
) 1
1−β
(
1
1− sr
)
−
ρ
λ
, (29)
and the steady-state growth rate of aggregate quality is obtained by substituting (29) into (28),
such that
g = ζ(1− β)(λ− 1)
(
1+ sy
1− sx
) 1
1−β
(
1
1− sr
)
−
(λ− 1)ρ
λ
. (30)
It can be seen that the growth rate of aggregate quality in (30) is independent upon the size of
labor supply. The scale effect is therefore removed. Additionally, we have the following result.
Lemma 1. The steady-state growth rate of aggregate quality g is increasing in the subsidy rate sy to
final-goods production, the subsidy rate sx to the purchase of intermediate goods, and the subsidy rate sr
to R&D.
Proof. Equation (30) shows that g is increasing in sy, sx, and sr.
Intuitively, on the one hand, either a higher subsidy rate sy to the production of final goods
or a higher subsidy rate sx to the purchase of intermediate goods can increase the demand for in-
termediate goods Xt(ν) in (9), which raises the profits of monopolistic firms in the intermediate-
goods sector brought by innovations. On the other hand, a higher subsidy rate sr to R&D de-
creases the cost of research. The above policy changes increase the benefits of innovations and
raise the incentives for R&D, so more resources are reallocated toward conducting research ac-
tivities; namely R&D expenditures tend to rise. Hence, (19) implies that the economy exhibits a
higher arrival rate of the next successful innovation, leading to a higher rate of economic growth
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g.11 These comparative statics for the subsidy rates are consistent with those in Barro and Sala-I-
Martin (2003), Zeng and Zhang (2007), and Yang (2018).
Moreover, using (22), we can compute the steady-state rate of labor income tax such that
τ =
1
1− β
(
sy
1+ sy
)
+
β2
1− β
(
sx
1− sx
)
+
p
ζ
(
β
1− β
)(
1
1+ sy
) 1
1−β
(1− sx)
β
1−β sr, (31)
which is a composite function of the subsidy rates sy, sx, and sr, where the steady-state arrival
rate of innovations p is given by (29). In addition, using (31), we can derive the steady-state level
of labor supply such that
L(sy, sx, sr) =
1
1+ θ
(1−β)(1−τ)(1+sy)
[
1− β2
(
1+sy
1−sx
)
− βpζ
(
1+sy
1−sx
) −β
1−β
] . (32)
From the above analysis, it can be seen that in the case of a higher sy, sx, and sr, τ would
increase because heavier taxation is required to balance the government budget, and such a
higher rate of labor income tax would decrease the supply of labor, which is captured by the
negative relationship between τ and L in (32). Nevertheless, a higher sy, sx, and sr raises the
growth rate g as shown in Lemma 1, and the enlarged production volume of output Yt induces
higher demand for labor L in equilibrium. Therefore, the overall effects of sy, sx, and sr on
L depend on the relative strength of these two opposing forces, and thus, seem analytically
difficult to assess. We leave this discussion for the numerical analysis later on.
4 Optimal policy analysis
In this section, we study the socially optimal solution that maximizes the welfare of the model
economy, followed by an analysis of the optimal policy regime showing how an appropriate joint
choice on subsidy rates can be made so as to replicate the first-best allocation.
4.1 Socially optimal solution
As for the first-best outcome, the social planner chooses a time path of consumption Ct and
labor supply Lt to maximize the households’ lifetime utility given by (1), subject to the resource
constraint Yt = Ct + Xt + Zt and the technology constraint given by
Q˙t =
ζ(λ− 1)Zt
Lt
, (33)
which is obtained by combining (19) and (28). Moreover, in the intermediate-goods sector, the
socially optimal price pt(ν) in line ν equals the marginal cost of production βqt(ν). Therefore,
11Recall that in Proposition 1, the steady-state growth rate of aggregate quality equals the counterparts of output
and consumption.
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the demand for intermediate goods in line ν is given by
Xt(ν) = β
1
β−1 Lt. (34)
Aggregating these demand functions across all industry lines yields the total expenditures on
the purchase of intermediate goods such that
Xt =
∫ 1
0
Pt(ν)Xt(ν)dν = β
β
β−1QtLt. (35)
Next, the total output in social optimum can be found by substituting (34) into (5), which is given
by
Yt =
(Lt)1−β
β
∫ 1
0
qt(ν)Xt(ν)
βdν = β
1
β−1QtLt. (36)
Therefore, using (34), (36), and the resource constraint in (33), we obtain the dynamics of aggre-
gate quality as follows:
Q˙t =
ζ(λ− 1)
Lt
[
β
1
β−1QtLt − β
β
β−1QtLt − Ct
]
. (37)
Then, the social planner’s solution can be derived by setting up the following current-value
Hamiltonian:
Hˆt(Ct, Lt,Qt, µˆt) = lnCt + θ ln(1− Lt) + µˆt
{
ζ(λ− 1)
Lt
[
β
1
β−1QtLt − β
β
β−1QtLt − Ct
]}
, (38)
where µˆt is the costate variable associated with the constraint (37). Thus, the first-order conditions
are respectively given by
∂Hˆt
∂Ct
= 0⇒
1
Ct
=
µˆtζ(λ− 1)
Lt
; (39)
∂Hˆt
∂Lt
= 0⇒
µˆtζ(λ− 1)Ct
(Lt)2
=
θ
1− Lt
; (40)
∂Hˆt
∂Qt
= µˆtζβ
1
β−1 (1− β)(λ− 1) = ρµˆt − ˙ˆµt, (41)
with the trasversality condition limt→0 e
−ρtµˆtQt = 0. Multiplying (37) by µˆt and multiplying (41)
by Qt, respectively, we can use (39) to obtain a differential equation such that ˙ˆµtQt + µˆtQ˙t =
ρµˆtQt − 1, implying that µˆtQt must jump to its steady-state value given by 1/ρ. This implies that
the dynamical behavior of the model in the social optimum is also characterized by saddle-point
stability.
Moreover, by inserting (39) into (40), we can see that the first-best level of labor supply L∗t is
stationary such that
L∗ =
1
1+ θ
. (42)
Accordingly, combining the saddle-point stability condition with (37), (39), (41) implies that in
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the first-best outcome, −µˆt, Qt, and Ct all grow at the same rate given by
g∗ = ζβ
1
β−1 (1− β)(λ− 1)− ρ. (43)
Comparing the (steady-state) equilibrium rate of economic growth g in (30) and first-best rate of
economic growth g∗ in (43) reveals that g can be higher or lower than g∗, depending on the values
of the parameters {ζ,λ, β, ρ} in g∗. This implication, which is well known in the Schumpeterian
growth model, is associated with various sources of R&D externalities. Specifically, a higher ζ or
λ implies a worsening of the surplus-appropriability problem and a higher β implies a worsening of
the business-stealing effect; both of these effects are a positive externality, making g∗ exceed g. In
contrast, a higher ρ implies a strengthening of the intertemporal-spillover effect, which is a negative
externality, making g∗ lower than g.
4.2 First-best policy instruments
In this subsection, we consider a combination of policy instruments (including the form(s) of
subsidies and/or taxes) that the policymaker can use to replicate the first-best optimal outcome.
A comparison between the steady-state equilibrium as shown in Subsection 3.1 and the socially
optimal outcome as shown in Subsection 4.1 reveals that the inefficiencies in the decentralized
setting arise from three layers of distortions as follows.
Monopoly pricing. The first distortion is present in the ratio of intermediate-goods expenditure
and total outputs Xt/Yt. This ratio equals the relative importance of intermediate goods in final
production β in the social optimum where no policy interventions are involved, whereas it equals
β2[(1 + sy)/(1 − sx)] in equilibrium where both the subsidy rates for final-goods production
and the purchase of intermediate goods are involved. It can be seen that without these policy
instruments (i.e., sy = sx = 0), the ratio Xt/Yt in equilibrium is always lower than in the first-best
outcome, producing the allocation inefficiencies. As shown in Acemoglu (2009), this distortion
stems from the monopoly rights protected by patents to preserve incentives for inventors to create
higher quality products. Thus, if these policy tools are set to satisfy the following condition:
1+ sy
1− sx
=
1
β
, (44)
then this layer of monopolistic distortion will be eliminated.
R&D externalities. The second distortion is present in the allocation of aggregate R&D expen-
ditures Zt, which determines the arrival rate of innovations p (i.e., (29)) and the growth rate of
aggregate quality (i.e., (30)) in the steady state. Given that the setting (1+ sy)/(1− sx) = 1/β
holds the optimal ratio of Xt and Yt, the R&D subsidy rate sr is the feasible policy lever that
can adjust the equilibrium level of aggregate spending on R&D. Specifically, when the value of
sr induces g(sr)|(1+sy)/(1−sx)=1/β > (<)g
∗, a too high (low) level of R&D expenditures is made
in the decentralized equilibrium, again producing allocation inefficiencies. As shown in Sub-
section 4.1, this distortion stems from the presence of different types of R&D externalities in
the canonical Schumpeterian growth model (i.e., the inclusion of the surplus-appropriability
problem, the business-stealing effect, and the intertemporal-spillover effect), and the wedge be-
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tween g and g∗ is determined by parameter values that represent the overall impact of these
R&D externalities. Therefore, if the choice of the R&D subsidy policy is designed to satisfy
g(sr)|(1+sy)/(1−sx)=1/β = g
∗, then this layer of distortion also will be eliminated. This yields the
first-best design of the R&D subsidy rate given by
s∗r =
1
1− ζλρ β
1
β−1 (1− β)(λ− 1)
. (45)
Notice that since g∗ in (43) is nonnegative, s∗r becomes negative, implying that the first-best R&D
policy is to tax the aggregate research spending. This is because when sr = 0, given that the
optimal ratio of Xt and Yt holds (i.e., (1+ sy)/(1− sx) = 1/β), the steady-state growth rate g
becomes always higher than the socially optimal counterpart g∗, meaning that the negative R&D
externalities dominates the positive R&D externalities in the model. To remove this inefficiency,
imposing an R&D tax (i.e., s∗r < 0) helps increase the cost of research, thus reducing the research
incentives and the resulting R&D level to equate the steady-state growth rate and the first-best
growth rate.12
Consumption-leisure tradeoff. The third distortion is present in the supply of labor Lt, which
determines the level of leisure in the steady state (i.e., 1− L). The first-best level of labor supply
L∗ equals 1/(1+ θ), depending only on the leisure preference θ, whereas the steady-state level
of labor supply L is given by (32), depending on the subsidy rates sy, sx, sr and the labor income
tax rate τ, in addition to other parameters. Given that the setting (1+ sy)/(1− sx) = 1/β holds
the optimal ratio of Xt and Yt and that sr = s∗r holds the optimal spending Zt on R&D, there is
one degree of freedom in the set of policy tools {sy, sx, sr} that can adjust the equilibrium level
of labor supply L. Specifically, when the choice of {sy, sx, sr} induces L(sy, sx, sr) > (<)L∗, too
much (little) labor is supplied in the decentralized equilibrium, which also produces an allocation
inefficiency. This distortion comes from the use of labor income taxes in the presence of elastic
labor supply, and it is determined by the consumption-leisure decision in (3). Thus, if the policy
mix {sy, sx, sr} is chosen to satisfy the condition such that
L(sy, sx, sr) = L
∗ =
1
1+ θ
, (46)
then the last layer of distortion will be removed and the social optimum can be attained accord-
ingly. Notice that if labor is supplied inelastically instead (i.e., θ = 0), then this distortion from
the consumption-leisure tradeoff no longer exists. In this case, using only one lever of the policy
mix {sy, sx} together along sr by taking either sy or sx as given is sufficient for remedying the
distortions from monopoly pricing and R&D externalities.13
12As for the implications for optimal R&D policy in scale-invariant growth frameworks, in the model of Segerstrom
(1998) with diminishing technological opportunities (DTO), either R&D taxes or subsidies are optimal for small-
sized innovations, where R&D taxes are optimal for sufficiently large-sized innovations. However, in the model of
Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) with rent protection activities (RPA), R&D taxes are optimal for small- and large-
seized innovations, and R&D subsidies are optimal only for medium-sized innovations. This result still applies to the
model with both DTO and RPA, as shown in S¸ener (2008).
13For example, under sx = 0, the first-best outcome is attained by setting sy = (1− β)/β and sr to (45), respectively.
Alternatively, under sy = 0, the first-best outcome is attained by setting sx = 1− β and sr to (45), respectively.
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Summarizing the above results yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The economy can achieve the first-best outcome in equilibrium with an optimal mix of
policy instruments {sy, sx, sr} determined by (44), (45), and (46).
Proof. Proven in the text.
This result is in a sharp contrast to that in Zeng and Zhang (2007). In their variety-expansion
model with distortionary taxes and elastic labor supply, the subsidies to the production of out-
puts and the purchase of intermediate goods are equivalent in terms of their growth and welfare
effects. Therefore, the two subsidy rates are combined to become an effective subsidy rate to
production (i.e., s f in their context), which reduces one degree of freedom in policy implementa-
tion. In their model, only two subsidy tools (i.e., the production subsidy and R&D subsidy) can
be used to optimize the equilibrium allocations. In the presence of three distortions as described
above, no first-best combination of policy tools {s f , sx} exists to attain the social optimum.
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Nevertheless, in our quality-ladder model, the subsidy rate to output production sy and that to
the user cost of intermediate goods sx operates separately. Hence, a combination of subsidy tools
{sy, sx, sr} suffices to eliminate all distortions in our model.15
5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to the US data to perform a quantitative analysis. First,
we numerically evaluate the effects of three subsidy instruments in terms of growth maximiza-
tion. Then, we quantify the effects of the subsidy instruments in terms of welfare maximization
by considering (a) the case where a mix of all instruments is implemented, (b) the case where a
single instrument is implemented, and (c) the case where a combination of any two instruments
is implemented, respectively.
5.1 Calibration
To perform this numerical analysis, the strategy is to assign steady-state values to the fol-
lowing structural parameters {ρ, β, ζ,λ, θ, sy, sx, sr}. We choose a standard value of 0.05 for the
discount rate ρ. As for the production parameter, we calibrate the value of β by setting the
markup ratio Pt(ν)/[ψqt(ν)] = 1/β to 1.5, which is consistent with the markup values of the US
economy considered in Hornstein (1993) and Devereux et al. (1996). As for the R&D productivity,
we calibrate the value of ζ by following Zeng and Zhang (2007) to choose the average growth rate
of GDP (i.e., g in (30)) in the US for the last 30 years, which has been roughly 3%, according to
14However, the social optimum might be attained in the model of Zeng and Zhang (2007) if the mix of policy
instruments is expanded to include a consumption tax τc in addition to the manufacturing subsidy s f and the R&D
subsidy sr.
15In the blocking-patents model of Yang (2018) with subsidization, given elastic labor supply and a lump-sum tax,
the distortions from monopoly pricing and the consumption-leisure tradeoff are consolidated to one layer of distortion
from the (inverse) supply of labor in manufacturing terms. In addition to the distortion from R&D externalities, by
fixing the patent-policy regime, an optimal mix of production subsidy and R&D subsidy will suffice to help recover
the first-best outcome.
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the Conference Board Total Economy Database. As for the step size of quality improvement, we
calibrate the value of λ by setting the time between arrivals of innovation 1/p to about 3 years, as
in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012). As for the leisure preference parameter, we calibrate the value
of θ by matching the standard moment of labor supply L to 1/3. Finally, given that the US has
used an R&D subsidy but not the manufacturing subsidy (including subsides to the production
of final goods and to the purchase of intermediate goods) in the past three decades, we choose
the market values of sy = sx = 0 and follow Grossmann et al. (2013) to calibrate the value of
sr by targeting the current R&D subsidy rate in the US, which is approximately 6.6% (OECD
(2009, 2013)). Table 1 summarizes the values of the parameters and variables in this quantitative
exercise.
Table 1: Calibration
Targeted Moments
g p L
0.030 0.333 0.333
Parameters ρ β ζ λ θ sy sx sr
0.050 0.667 1.063 1.090 1.845 0.000 0.000 0.066
5.2 Numerical results
Before proceeding to the cases in which the policy instruments are employed, this analysis
starts from the comparisons in the growth rate and welfare level between the decentralized equi-
librium in which realistic values are calibrated (i.e., the benchmark case) and an extreme scenario
in which no policy tools are introduced (i.e., the no-policy case). The purpose of this exercise is to
quantify the differences in growth and welfare of the equilibrium level in our model as compared
to in the original quality-ladder model. The growth rates and welfare levels of these two cases
are shown in Table 2. It can be seen that as compared to our benchmark case, the growth rate
declines by 0.230% (percentage point) and the welfare level declines by 0.0825% (percent change)
when all policy interventions are dismantled.16 Notice that in this comparison, the equilibrium
subsidy rates to final-goods production and the purchase of intermediate goods are identical in
the benchmark case and in the no-policy case (i.e., sy = sx = 0). Therefore, the growth and
welfare differences between the two cases are only driven by the presence of subsidies to R&D,
which effectively stimulates the arrival rate of innovations in equilibrium, as shown in (29). This
result tends to justify the use of R&D subsidies in promoting growth and raising welfare with
the current US policy in the absence of the use of any manufacturing subsidies.17
Moreover, from the no-policy case to the benchmark case, the labor income tax rate τ rises
from 0 to 4.14% to finance the use of R&D subsidies sr, and the labor supply L rises slightly from
16See Appendix A.2 for the derivation of the steady-state welfare function. The welfare difference is expressed as
the usual equivalent variation in consumption flow such that exp(ρ∆U)− 1, where ∆U denotes the difference in the
steady-state welfare.
17Note that the main focus of this exercise is not on the sizes of the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing
subsidy/tax rates, but rather on the comparisons in the policy effectiveness for growth and welfare among the decen-
tralized equilibrium and the outcomes with the optimal policy instrument(s).
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0.3329 to 0.3333 in response. Corresponding to the discussion in Subsection 3.1, this result implies
that the effect of sr through the growth channel that stimulates the demand for production labor
dominates the counterpart through the taxation channel that stifles the supply of labor.
Table 2: Growth and Welfare under the benchmark case and the no-policy case
Benchmark g U L τ
(sy = sx = 0, sr = 0.066) 0.0300 −10.2996 0.3333 0.0414
No-policy g U L τ
(sy = sx = sr = 0) 0.0277 −10.3161 0.3329 0.0000
5.2.1 Growth-maximizing subsidization
According to Lemma 1, a higher rate of subsidies to the production of final goods (i.e., sy),
the purchase of intermediate goods (i.e., sx), and R&D (i.e., sr) leads to a quantitatively identical
effect on the steady-state rate of economic growth (namely, a higher g). Therefore, this subsection
quantifies and compares the size of the effect of each subsidy instrument in terms of growth
maximization.
First, we consider the case in which the three policy instruments are used. As shown in
Table 3, the maximized rate of economic growth g is 10.76% and the growth-maximizing rates
of subsidy are given by sy = 0.09, sx = 0.27, and sr = 0.05, respectively. Since the level of R&D
subsidy rate in the current case (i.e., sr = 0.05) does not differ considerably from the counterpart
in the benchmark case (i.e., sr = 0.066), the significant increase by 7.76% (percentage point)
in g is mainly driven by the use of subsidies in manufacturing sy and sx. It can be seen that
among these growth-maximizing rates of subsidy, sx is the largest whereas sr is the smallest,
implying that sr tends to be less effective in enhancing economic growth than sy and sx. In
other words, in this model, the benefits of innovations are much more sensitive to the increase
in monopolistic profits (due to more production sales in final goods) rather than the reduction
in research costs. In addition, as compared to the benchmark case, the labor income tax rate τ
rises to 78.71% to finance the higher level of subsidy expenditure. However, the supply of labor
increases dramatically to 0.9997; this may be due to the large growth effect that stimulates the
demand for labor in manufacturing. Table 3 also reveals that using all subsidy tool will generate
excess growth compared to the growth rate of 8.99% in the social planner’s solution (which will
be derived in Subsection 5.2.2).
Table 3: Growth maximization under a combination of all instruments
All subsidies g L τ
(sy = 0.09, sx = 0.27, sr = 0.05) 0.1076 0.9997 0.7871
Second, we consider the case in which only a single subsidy instrument is used. Figure 1
depicts the relationships between the growth rate g and each of the policy levers {sy, sx, sr}, and
it verifies the implication of Lemma 1 such that the growth rate g is monotonically increasing in
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each of the subsidy rates.18 Notice that the pattern in Figure 1 demonstrates that in the presence
of subsidization (i.e., sy > 0, sx > 0, sr > 0), the growth effect of subsidies to the purchase
of intermediate goods sx (i.e., the red dotted line) is more significant than the growth effects of
other two subsidies sy and sr (i.e., the blue solid line and the green dotted line, respectively). This
Notes: The range in consideration for sy is [−1, 0.5], for sx is [−1, 0.341], and for sr is [−1, 0.612], respectively.
Fig. 1. The relationship between the growth rate and a single subsidy rate
comparison in growth effectiveness is clearly shown in Table 4, which presents the situations of
growth maximization for each subsidy tool. Specifically, under the growth-maximizing rate of
49.9% for subsidies to final goods production sy (with a tax rate τ of 99.87%), the growth rate
is 10.32% and the labor supply is 0.0261, whereas under the growth-maximizing rate of 34.1%
for subsidies to the purchase of intermediate goods sx (with a tax rate τ of 68.99%), the growth
rate is 10.73% and the labor supply is 0.9848. Nevertheless, under the growth-maximizing rate
of 61.2% for R&D subsidies sr (with a tax rate τ of 99.87%), the growth rate is 7.8% and the labor
supply is 0.078. This result implies that when only a single subsidy instrument is implemented to
stimulate growth, subsidizing R&D (the purchase of intermediate goods) is least (most) effective,
at the expense of the smallest (largest) taxation per wage rate (i.e., τL); this policy implication
differs from the comparison in the growth effectiveness of subsidy instruments in Zeng and
Zhang (2007) such that the R&D subsidy is more growth-enhancing than the other subsidies.
Additionally, the above analysis justifies the fact in Table 3 that the growth-maximizing rate of
sx (sr) is the largest (smallest) among the three subsidy tools if the choice of all tools becomes
available.
Finally, it is interesting to see how the growth effect changes when a mix of any two sub-
sidy instruments is used. Table 5 displays the growth-maximization solutions for three different
combinations of the subsidy rates accordingly. It can be seen that the three strategies of pol-
18In this numerical analysis, to ensure that the consumption level is positive and that the labor supply is bounded
between 0 and 1, we restrict the range of sy to [−1, 0.5], of sx to [−1, 0.341], and of sr to [−1, 0.612], respectively.
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Table 4: Growth maximization under a single instrument
Subsidies to production of final goods g L τ
(sy = 0.4990, sx = 0, sr = 0) 0.1032 0.0261 0.9987
Subsidies to purchase of intermediate goods g L τ
(sy = 0, sx = 0.3410, sr = 0) 0.1073 0.9848 0.6899
R&D subsidies g L τ
(sy = 0, sx = 0, sr = 0.6120) 0.0780 0.0198 0.9987
icy combinations produce similar rates of growth; they are all higher than the growth rates by
using a single subsidy tool but lower than the growth rate by using the three tools together.
Notice that the policy combinations with subsidization to R&D generate lower growth rates than
the one without it, which confirms the previous finding that sr is the least effective to enhance
growth. In particular, subsidizing the mix of final-goods production and R&D with sy = 47.5%
and sr = 5% yields the lowest growth-maximizing rate of 10.35% (with a tax rate of 99.98%),
whereas subsidizing the manufacturing factors with sy = 42% and sx = 6.5% yields the highest
growth-maximizing rate of 10.75% (with a tax rate τ of 98%).
Table 5: Growth maximization under a combination of two instruments
Subsidies to manufacturing g L τ
(sy = 0.4200, sx = 0.0650, sr = 0) 0.1075 0.9999 0.9800
Subsidies to production of final goods and R&D g L τ
(sy = 0.4750, sx = 0, sr = 0.0500) 0.1035 0.0033 0.9998
Subsidies to purchase of intermediate goods and R&D g L τ
(sy = 0, sx = 0.3300, sr = 0.0500) 0.1074 0.9918 0.7071
5.2.2 Welfare-maximizing subsidization
Optimizing a mix of all instruments. The analysis now quantifies the implications of welfare-
maximizing subsidies when the three policy instruments {sy, sx, sr} are implemented, as dis-
played in Table 6. Using our benchmark calibration, the optimal mix of all subsidy instruments
is given by s∗y = 0.395, s
∗
x = 0.07, and s
∗
r = −0.745. Recalling Proposition 2, the use of this opti-
mal mix of subsidy rates induces the decentralized equilibrium to achieve the first-best solution.
Intuitively, the first-best outcome in this model is restored by adjusting three policy levers to
remedy the three distortions occurring in the decentralized equilibrium. First, given sy = sx = 0
in equilibrium, the fraction (1+ sy)/(1− sx) = 1 implies that the subsidy rate to the production
of final goods is less compatible with the subsidy rate to the purchase of intermediate goods
in the sense that (1+ sy)/(1− sx) is smaller than its optimal value 1/β. This is the first ineffi-
ciency stemming from the distorted ratio of intermediate-goods expenditure and total outputs
Xt/Yt in equilibrium in which subsidies to manufacturing are absent. Second, there is a layer
of inefficiency stemming from the allocation on the aggregate R&D spending, because with the
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suboptimal subsidy rate to R&D (i.e., sr = 0.066), the equilibrium growth rate of g = 0.030 is
substantially lower than the socially optimal one g∗ = 0.0575. Third, there is another layer of in-
efficiency stemming from the supply of labor, since in the presence of distortionary labor income
tax τ, the suboptimal subsidy rates {sy, sx, sr} yield a level of labor supply at L = 0.333 in equi-
librium, which is smaller than the socially optimal level at L∗ = 0.3530. Thus, when the subsidy
rates to manufacturing are raised and the subsidy rate to R&D is lowered to their first-best levels
{s∗y, s
∗
x, s
∗
r }, respectively, the above three layers of distortions are eliminated by reallocating the
resources in the use of final goods and in the supply of labor. As a result of correcting inefficien-
cies, the increment in welfare from the decentralized equilibrium to the social optimum is very
considerable (i.e., approximately 75.055% of consumption).
Table 6: Welfare maximization under a combination of all instruments
All subsidies g∗ U∗ L∗ τ∗
(s∗y = 0.395, s
∗
x = 0.07, s
∗
r = −0.745) 0.0575 0.8990 0.3530 0.7391
Two interesting points around the above results are worthwhile discussing. First, notice that
the first-best rate of R&D subsidy s∗r becomes negative (i.e., an R&D tax) under the benchmark
calibration. This is because when the subsidy rates to manufacturing are fixed at their first-best
levels (i.e., s∗y = 0.3950 and s
∗
x = 0.0700), the equilibrium outcome with no R&D subsidies (i.e.,
sr = 0) will generate a higher growth rate to the economy as compared to the social optimum
(i.e., g = 0.1035 > g∗ = 0.0575). Hence, to depress the equilibrium R&D, the level of sr has
to be lowered to be smaller than 0. The mechanism for the first-best rate of R&D subsidy to
be negative in this model is similar to the mechanism for the first-best rule of profit division
to be positive in Yang (2018), who considers the effects of blocking patents in a quality-ladder
model; a negative R&D subsidy rate and a positive profit-division rule play the same role in
mitigating the R&D level and the growth rate. In other words, achieving the social optimum
in quality-ladder models requires a policy instrument that can be growth-depressing, since the
class of quality ladder models features R&D exteralities (e.g., the business-stealing effect) that
could lead to suboptimally excess growth. This is in a sharp contrast to the policy analysis
of subsidization in variety-expansion models. For example, in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2003)
with inelastic labor and lump-sum taxes, using a subsidy to the production of final goods or to
the purchase of intermediate goods alone, either of which is growth-enhancing, can induce the
decentralized equilibrium to achieve the social optimum, given that the equilibrium growth rate
in their setting is lower than the socially optimal growth rate. In Zeng and Zhang (2007) who
consider the model of Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2003) with elastic labor and distortionary taxes,
a combination of analogous subsidy tools cannot achieve the first-best outcome.
Additionally, the majority of welfare improvements moving from the decentralized equilib-
rium to the social optimum stems from remedying the distortion in monopoly pricing. This
can be seen in the following policy experiment that decomposes the distortions present in the
current framework. Consider an intermediate case where the subsidy rates are given by sy = 0,
sx = 0.0669, and sr = 0.3642, and the resulting level of welfare is U = −10.2063. In this case,
the equilibrium growth rate g and the equilibrium labor supply L attain their first-best levels of
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g∗ and L∗, respectively. Therefore, given that the ratio (1+ sy)/(1− sx) in the intermediate case
(which is 1.0717) does not drastically differ from its counterpart in the benchmark case (which
is unity), the welfare difference between the benchmark case and the intermediate case mainly
stems from the distortions in R&D externalities and the consumption-labor tradeoff, denoted by
ξ1 = 0.468%. In addition, it is straightforward to see that the welfare difference between the
intermediate case and the first-best case stems from the distortion in monopoly pricing, denoted
by ξ2 = 74.240%. Accordingly, it is obvious that the magnitude of ξ2 is much more significant
than that of ξ1. This finding is consistent with Nuño (2011) and Yang (2018), both of whom argue
that most of the welfare losses in the decentralized equilibrium of R&D-based growth models are
attributed to the presence of suboptimal choices of policy tools that affect the resource allocation
in the monopolistic intermediate-goods sector.
Sensitivity. To examine the sensitivity of the above numerical analysis, we consider the follow-
ing exercises with respect to the structural parameters {β, ρ,λ, ζ, θ}. First, we vary the value of β
to 0.6849 such that the implied markup ratio 1/β = 1.46 is consistent with the average level of the
empirical estimates in De Loecker et al. (2018) for US firms during 1996–2005. Second, the values
of {ρ,λ, ζ} are changed so that the resulting optimal growth rate g∗ is maintained at the rate of
0.0501, which is the value generated by setting β alone to 0.6849 in the first sensitivity exercise.19
Additionally, we recalibrate the model by using the leisure preference parameter θ = 2. Table 7
presents the welfare level U∗, the growth rate g∗, the labor supply L∗, the consumption level C∗0 ,
and the tax rate τ∗, respectively, under the alternative sets of structural parameters.
It can be seen that, the qualitative pattern and the quantitative magnitude of the main results
are quite robust. First, the optimal subsidy rate to output production s∗y continues to be the largest
among the policy instruments, whereas the optimal subsidy rate to R&D s∗r is still negative. This
result continues to imply that s∗y and s
∗
x are the two subsidy rates that eliminate most of the
inefficiencies. Second, under the new parameter settings of ζ, λ, ρ and θ, the welfare level U∗
declines, as compared to the counterpart in the benchmark first-best case as shown in Table 6.
The reason is as follows. A lower ζ or λ (and also a higher ρ or θ) raises C∗0 and reduces L
∗,
yielding a positive effect on U∗. Furthermore, this parameter change decreases g∗, yielding a
negative effect on U∗. The latter effect outweighs the former effect, leading the overall level of
U∗ to decrease. Nevertheless, under a higher value of β, the considerable rise in C∗0 generates
a sufficiently positive welfare effect, in addition to the positive welfare effect brought by the
reduction in L∗, to dominate the negative welfare effect from the decrease in g∗. Hence, the
resulting level of welfare U∗ in this case increases as compared to the benchmark first-best case.
Optimizing a single instrument. Then, we consider the cases in which only one single instru-
ment is used. Figure 2 depicts the relationships between the welfare level U and each of policy
levers {sy, sx, sr}. It can be seen that the welfare level U exhibits an inverted-U shape for each of
the subsidy rates. In addition, Table 8 presents the details on welfare maximization by optimizing
each subsidy tool. Specifically, the welfare-maximizing rate of 30.70% for subsidies to final goods
production sy (with a tax rate τ of 48.32%) yields a growth rate of 6.70%, a welfare level of -2.1760,
19Notice that from (43), the parameter values of {β, ρ,λ, ζ} determine the socially optimal growth g∗. Given that
g∗ is nonlinear in β, it is technically convenient to firstly set the alternative value of β, yielding a new value of g∗.
Then the alternative values of other values are set to match this implied first-best growth rate in order to compare the
welfare effects of these parameters in removing distortions.
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Table 7: Sensitivity checks
β = 0.6849 U∗ g∗ L∗ C∗0 τ
∗
(s∗y = 0.4038, s
∗
x = 0.0385, s
∗
r = −0.8452) 1.2208 0.0501 0.3339 0.8251 0.6711
ζ = 0.9891 U∗ g∗ L∗ C∗0 τ
∗
(s∗y = 0.4422, s
∗
x = 0.0385, s
∗
r = −0.8452) -0.6820 0.0501 0.3339 0.7502 0.6799
λ = 1.0838 U∗ g∗ L∗ C∗0 τ
∗
(s∗y = 0.4459, s
∗
x = 0.0360, s
∗
r = −0.8542) -0.6776 0.0501 0.3349 0.7524 0.6793
ρ = 0.0574 U∗ g∗ L∗ C∗0 τ
∗
(s∗y = 0.4382, s
∗
x = 0.0412, s
∗
r = −0.9600) -1.6970 0.0501 0.3316 0.7967 0.6602
θ = 2 U∗ g∗ L∗ C∗0 τ
∗
(s∗y = 0.4462, s
∗
x = 0.0358, s
∗
r = −0.7433) -0.4325 0.0576 0.3181 0.6654 0.7001
Notes: The range in consideration for sy is [−1, 0.5], for sx is [−1, 0.341], and for sr is [−1, 0.612], respectively.
Fig. 2. The relationship between the welfare level and a single subsidy rate
and a labor supply of 0.3240, whereas the welfare-maximizing rate of 22.30% for subsidies to the
purchase of intermediate goods sx (with a tax rate τ of 38.27%) yields a growth rate of 6.38%,
a welfare level of -2.5863, and a labor supply of 0.4117. However, the welfare-maximizing rate
of 6.00% for R&D subsidies sr (with a tax rate τ of 3.74%) yields a growth rate of 2.98%, a wel-
fare level of -10.2995, and a labor supply of 0.3333. This result of welfare maximization implies
that when only a single subsidy instrument is adopted to promote welfare, subsidizing R&D
(the production of final goods) is least (most) effective, at the expense of the smallest (largest)
taxation per wage rate τL. The reason is as follows. Most of inefficiencies in this model are
realized by correcting the distortions in monopoly pricing and the consumption-leisure tradeoff,
mainly through the use of sy and sx. Therefore, when the subsidy rate is implemented alone, sy
and sx tend to be more welfare-effective than sr, given that the latter is used to mainly correct
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the distortion brought by R&D externalities.20 21 This policy implication again differs from the
comparison in the welfare effectiveness of subsidy instruments in Zeng and Zhang (2007) such
that the R&D subsidy can be more welfare-improving than the other subsidies.
Table 8: Welfare maximization under a single instrument
Subsidies to production of final goods U L τ
(sy = 0.3070, sx = 0, sr = 0) -2.1760 0.3240 0.4832
Subsidies to purchase of intermediate goods U L τ
(sy = 0, sx = 0.2230, sr = 0) -2.5963 0.4117 0.3827
R&D subsidies U L τ
(sy = 0, sx = 0, sr = 0.0600) -10.2995 0.3333 0.0374
Optimizing a mix of two instruments. We also consider a policy experiment in which a combi-
nation of any two instruments is optimized. Table 9 reports the quantitative implications of the
optimal mix of any two subsidy tools under the benchmark parameterization. The relationships
between a combination of two subsidy tools and the welfare level are depicted in Figures 3, 4,
5, respectively, for an easier view from different angles. Specifically, subsidies to manufacturing
(namely the combination of sy and sx) yield a welfare level of -2.0785, which is lower than the
welfare level under the combination of sx and sr (i.e., -0.1520) and under the combination of sy
and sr (i.e., 0.7471).
It is obvious that an optimal mix of two subsidy rates is substantially welfare-improving
than the decentralized equilibrium and the outcomes optimizing a single subsidy. For example,
the welfare level under the combination of sy and sx, which is the lowest one among the three
combinations of any two subsidies, is higher than the welfare level under the decentralized
equilibrium by 50.841% of consumption. Moreover, the welfare level under the combination of sy
and sx is higher than the welfare level under optimizing sy alone, which is the largest one among
the outcomes using a single subsidy, by 0.489% of consumption. Nevertheless, the welfare level
under an optimal mix of two subsidy rates is much lower than the counterpart under the optimal
combination of three subsidy rates (i.e., the social optimum).22
Notice that among the three combinations of any two policy instruments, the combinations
with subsidies to R&D (namely either subsidizing the production of final goods sy and R&D sr
or subsidizing the purchase of intermediate goods sx and R&D sr) are more welfare-enhancing
than subsidies to manufacturing only (i.e., the mix of subsidies to output production sy and the
purchase of intermediate goods sx). This finding is in line with the argument in Zeng and Zhang
20The welfare improvements from the decentralized equilibrium to the outcomes by optimizing the subsidy to
output production and to the purchase of intermediate goods are significantly large (which are 50.1073% and 46.9857%
of consumption, respectively), whereas the counterpart by optimizing R&D subsidy alone is marginally small (which
is roughly 0.001% of consumption).
21Similar to the analysis of growth maximization, this welfare-maximization analysis justifies our findings in Table
6 such that the welfare-maximizing rate of sy (sr) is the largest (smallest) among the three subsidy tools if the choice
of all tools becomes available.
22The welfare level under the combination of sy and sx, the combination of sx and sr, and the combination of sy and
sr, is apparently lower than the welfare level under the socially optimal outcome by 160.53%, 5.3955%, and 0.7624%
of consumption, respectively.
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Table 9: Welfare maximization under a combination of two instruments
Subsidies to manufacturing U L τ
(sy = 0.2300, sx = 0.0600, sr = 0) -2.0785 0.3525 0.6461
Subsidies to production of final goods and R&D U L τ
(sy = 0.4950, sx = 0, sr = −0.7300) 0.7471 0.3173 0.7309
Subsidies to purchase of intermediate goods and R&D U L τ
(sy = 0, sx = 0.3100, sr = −0.7100) -0.1520 0.4352 0.2271
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Welfare effect of subsidies to manufacturing
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Welfare effect of subsidies to production of final goods and R&D
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Welfare effect of subsidies to purchase of intermediate goods and R&D
(2007) such that the joint use of subsidies is to take advantage of their relative strength in correct-
ing different types of distortions. Specifically, subsidies to manufacturing tend to be more effec-
tive in eliminating the distortions from monopoly pricing and the consumption-leisure tradeoff,
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both of which are considered as the static efficiency losses, whereas subsidies to R&D tend to
be more effective in eliminating the distortion from R&D externalities, which is considered as
the dynamic efficiency losses. As a result, mixing the subsidies that remedy different types of
inefficiencies (i.e., both static and dynamic inefficiencies) does better than mixing the subsidies
that remedy the same type of inefficiencies (i.e., only the static inefficiency).
6 Conclusion
In this study, we explore the growth and welfare implications of a subsidization-policy regime
in a quality-ladder endogenous growth model with elastic labor supply, where subsidies are
financed by distortionary labor income taxes. This subsidization regime includes three policy
instruments: subsidies to the production of final goods, subsidies to the purchase of intermediate
goods, and subsidies to R&D. In this model, the equilibrium allocations are subject to three layers
of distortions, namely, the distortion on the monopoly pricing, the consumption-leisure tradeoff,
and the R&D externalities. Therefore, the policymaker can adjust the equilibrium allocations to
mitigate these distortions by properly implementing the subsidy tools.
The result in the current study differs substantially from those in the literature. In the pres-
ence of lump-sum taxes, Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2003) show that in a variety-expansion model
with inelastic labor supply, the social optimum can be attained by subsidizing manufacturing
(through either the production of final output or the purchase of intermediate products), whereas
the analysis of Acemoglu (2009) (and Yang (2018)) implies that in a quality-ladder model with
inelastic (elastic) labor supply, the social optimum can be achieved by subsidizing manufacturing
and research together. With elastic labor supply and distorionary taxes, Zeng and Zhang (2007)
show that in a variety-expansion model, the social optimum cannot be restored by using a single
type of subsidies or their combination. Nevertheless, under a similar setting of labor and taxes
as in Zeng and Zhang (2007), our result shows that in a quality-ladder model, the mix of subsidy
instruments to the production of final goods, the purchase of intermediate goods, and research
is able to replicate the first-best optimal outcome by correcting all distortions occurring in the
decentralized equilibrium. Specifically, subsidies to manufacturing tend to remove the static dis-
tortions on monopoly pricing and the consumption-leisure tradeoff, whereas subsidies to R&D
tend to remove the distortion on R&D externalities. Therefore, the process of innovation is cru-
cial in determining the possibility of which the social optimum is attained in a decentralized
equilibrium with the aid of subsidies.
To quantify the effectiveness of the subsidy tools in promoting economic growth and raising
social welfare, this model is calibrated to the US data to perform a numerical analysis on growth
maximization and welfare maximization. First, the use of more types of subsidies ameliorates
the effects on maximizing growth and welfare. Second, as for the use of a single instrument, we
find that the R&D subsidy is less growth-enhancing and welfare-improving than the other subsi-
dies. Finally, as for the use of a mix of any two instruments, subsidizing final-goods production
and the purchase of intermediate goods is most effective in promoting growth but least effec-
tive in raising welfare. These quantitative results in the comparisons of the growth and welfare
effectiveness among subsidy tools differ significantly from some existing literature (e.g., Zeng
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and Zhang (2007)) showing that R&D subsidy is more growth-enhancing and welfare-improving
than the other types of subsidies. Although subsidizing R&D investment is the common prac-
tice as observed in many industrial countries (such as the US), the present study provides an
important policy implication on extending the dimensionality of the fiscal-policy (or industrial-
policy) system by increasing the number of subsidy/tax tools, given that the mechanisms of these
dimensions work differently in allocating resources and eliminating inefficiencies.
Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In this proof, we examine the stability of this model given a stationary path of sy,t, sx,t, and sr,t.
First, define the transformed variable Ωt ≡ Ct/Yt. Then, taking the log of Ωt and differentiating
it with respect to time yields
Ω˙t
Ωt
=
C˙t
Ct
−
Y˙t
Yt
(A.1)
From (21), the asset-market clearing condition is given by
At =
∫ 1
0
Vt(ν)dν =
(1− sr)
ζλ
QtLt, (A.2)
and recalling from (14), the aggregate final-goods production function is given by
Yt =
1
β
(
1+ sy
1− sx
) β
1−β
QtLt. (A.3)
Using (A.2) and (A.3), we obtain
Yt =
1
β
(
1+ sy
1− sx
) β
1−β
(
ζλ
1− sr
)
At = χ1At, (A.4)
where χ1 ≡ [(ζλ/β)/(1− sr)][(1+ sy)/(1− sx)]
β/(1−β)
> 0 is a composite parameter. Hence,
(A.4) implies
Y˙t
Yt
=
A˙t
At
. (A.5)
In addition, using the household’s budget constraint (2) and (A.5) yields
Y˙t
Yt
=
A˙t
At
= rt + (1− τt)
WtLt
At
−
Ct
At
= rt + (1− τt)
χ1WtLt
Yt
−
χ1Ct
Yt
. (A.6)
Applying the definition of Ωt and the Euler equation (4), we have
Ω˙t
Ωt
=
C˙t
Ct
−
Y˙t
Yt
= −ρ− (1− τt)
χ1WtLt
Yt
+ χ1Ωt = χ1Ωt − (1− τt)χ1(1− β)− ρ, (A.7)
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where the last equality uses the labor share of output such that WtLt/Yt = (1+ sy)(1− β) in (8).
Next, to derive the relationship between τt and Ωt, we combine (5) and (9) to obtain the ratio
of aggregate expenditures on intermediate goods to final goods:
Xt = β
2
(
1+ sy
1− sx
)
Yt. (A.8)
Moreover, substituting (8) and (A.8) into the government budget constraint τtWtLt = syYt +
sxXt + srZt in (22) yields the ratio of aggregate expenditures on research to final goods:
Zt =
Yt
sr
[
τt(1+ sy)(1− β)− sxβ
2
(
1+ sy
1− sx
)
− sy
]
. (A.9)
Then, using (A.8) and (A.9) in the final-goods resource constraint Yt = Ct + Xt + Zt, a few steps
of manipulation yield
τt =
sr
(1+ sy)(1− β)

1+ β2
(
1+sy
1−sx
)
(sx − sr) + sy
sr


︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡χ2
−
srΩt
(1+ sy)(1− β)
, (A.10)
where χ2 is a composite parameter.
Finally, substituting (A.10) into (A.7) yields a one-dimensional differential equation in Ωt:
Ω˙t
Ωt
= (1− sr)χ1Ωt − χ1(1− χ2)(1+ sy)(1− β)− ρ. (A.11)
Therefore, given that Ωt is a control variable and that its coefficient in (A.11) is positive (i.e.,
(1− sr)χ1 = (ζλ/β)[(1+ sy)/(1− sx)]
β/(1−β)
> 0), the dynamics of Ωt is characterized by saddle-
point stability such that Ωt jumps immediately to its steady-state value given by
Ω =
χ1(1− χ2)(1+ sy)(1− sx) + ρ
(1− sr)χ1
, (A.12)
where the parameter space is restricted to ensure Ω > 0. Given the stationary Ω, (A.10) immedi-
ately follows that τt = τ is also time invariant, and then Xt/Yt from (A.8) and Zt/Yt from (A.9)
are both stationary. It then implies that variables {Yt,Ct,Xt,Zt} share the identical growth rate.
We now prove that Lt must be stationary as well. Dividing the both sides of (3) by Yt, we
have
(1− τ)
(
Wt
Yt
−
WtLt
Yt
)
= θΩ. (A.13)
Inserting (8) and (A.10) into (A.13) yields
Wt
Yt
=
θΩ + (1+ sy)(1− β)(1− χ2) + srΩ
1− χ2 + srΩ/[(1+ sy)(1− β)]
, (A.14)
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which implies
W˙t
Wt
=
Y˙t
Yt
. (A.15)
Taking the log of (8) and differentiating the resulting equation with respect to time, together with
(A.15), yields
L˙t
Lt
=
Y˙t
Yt
−
W˙t
Wt
= 0. (A.16)
Therefore, Lt = L must be stationary holding constant sy, sx and sr. Moreover, from (16), we
eventually have
Y˙t
Yt
=
W˙t
Wt
=
Q˙t
Qt
=
C˙t
Ct
=
X˙t
Xt
=
Z˙t
Zt
. (A.17)
A.2 Derivation of the steady-state welfare function
The steady-state welfare function is obtained by imposing the BGP in the utility function (1).
Integrating it yields
U0 =
1
ρ
[
lnC0 +
g
ρ
+ θ ln(1− L)
]
, (A.18)
where C0 is the initial level of consumption. Using (3) and (16), C0 can be reexpressed as follows:
C0 =
(
1− τ
θ
)
(1+ sy)
1
1−β
(
1
1− sx
) β
1−β
(
β
1− β
)
Q0(1− L), (A.19)
where Q0 is the initial level of aggregate quality. Then, substituting (A.19) into (A.18) yields
U =
1
ρ


ln(1− τ)− ln θ +
(
1
1− β
)
ln(1+ sy) +
(
β
1− β
)
ln
(
1
1− sx
)
+ ln
β
1− β
+
[
ζ
ρ
(λ− 1)(1− β)
(
1+ sy
1− sx
) 1
β
−
λ− 1
λ
]
+ (1+ θ) ln(1− L),


, (A.20)
where the exogenous terms have dropped and τ and L are given by (31) and (32), respectively.
Hence, given that τ and L are functions of the policy instruments {sy, sx, sr}, U is also a function
of the policy instruments {sy, sx, sr}.
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